Sinica talks to the Chinese embassy in Washington D.C. – The China Project (2023)

Below is a transcript of the Sinica Podcast with Xu Xueyuan.

Kaiser Kuo: Welcome to the Sinica Podcast, a weekly discussion of current affairs in China, produced in partnership with The China Project. Subscribe to Access from The China Project to get access. Access to, not only our great daily newsletter, but all the original writing on our website at We’ve got reported stories, essays, and editorials, great explainers and trackers, regular columns, and of course, a growing library of podcasts. We cover everything from China’s fraught foreign relations to its ingenious entrepreneurs, from the ongoing repression of Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples in China’s Xinjiang region, to Beijing’s ambitious plans to shift the Chinese economy onto a post-carbon footing. It’s a feast of business, political, and cultural news about a nation that is reshaping the world. We cover China with neither fear nor favor.

I’m Kaiser Kuo, and I am in London, England right now.

This week on Sinica, we’ve got an interview with Minister Xú Xuéyuān 徐学渊, deputy chief of mission and minister at the embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Washington, DC. The interview was taped on Monday, September 19 at the embassy. Before we get to the interview, I want to be transparent about the process. Minister Xu’s team did request questions in advance and they were all accepted without alteration, except actually to suggest merging two questions both related to public diplomacy. Questions on subjects like Taiwan or Xinjiang, or China’s zero-COVID policy were all accepted without even any suggestions on wording. I was able to actually follow up on questions, including some of those on sensitive topics with no objections at all from the minister or her staff. Where Minister Xu cited numbers and made factual claims, I have made a good faith effort to check them. For example, on the number of acres in the recent offshore oil leases that were approved by the Biden administration. Doubtless, there will be some listeners who wish that I had been more forceful in the questions.

And there may be some who believe I was perhaps too forceful, though I doubt that. Sinica is, as you know, not a gotcha show, and really never has been. It’s not hard talk. Still, I think there is value in hearing the perspectives of a ranking Chinese diplomat, and I hope you’ll agree that the interview is very much worth listening to in that light. The interview that follows has only been edited for clarity and concision, taking out filler or hesitation words and pickups. Enjoy.

First of all, thank you very much Minister Xu for inviting me to the embassy. And I’m really looking forward to this conversation.

Xu Xueyuan: Thank you for having me.

Kaiser: So, you have been working on U.S.-China relations and the United States for well over a decade now. And you have seen how the relationship has changed from the Obama administration through the Trump administration, and now nearly two years into the Biden administration. What is your sense of how the Biden administration’s approach to China differs from that of former President Donald Trump?

Xu: Yeah, actually many people asked this question to me. So, the U.S. midterm elections are drawing near, which is a midterm exam, as we say, for the Biden administration by the American people. Perhaps it is time also to give a midterm exam for the Biden administration’s China policy as well. It’s been two years, as you said, since the Biden administration came into office, but the China policy of the U.S., to be frank, has not stepped out of the shadow of the previous administration. Many people are asking why, including us in the Chinese embassy and also many Chinese officials in Beijing. We believe that the root cause lies in the big problem of the U.S. mentality toward China. The U.S. side takes China as the most serious competitor and the most serious long-term challenge. These are exact words they used to describe China and the relationship.

This is a serious misperception of China-U.S. relations and misreading of China’s development, and would mislead people of the two countries and the international community. Many American friends often see their country as open and inclusive. Actually, this is also the perception by many Chinese actually. But now we need to ask two questions. First, does the U.S. accept the development of a major country with different history system and a culture like China? Does it acknowledge that the 1.4 billion Chinese people also have the rights to pursue wellbeing? As long as these two problems are figured out, many problems in China-U.S. relations can be solved easily. If China really has a so-called long game, these words, this expression is frequently used to describe China-U.S. relationship.

Kaiser: Yeah, Rush Doshi’s book. Yeah.

Xu: It is to let all Chinese people lead a good life. That is our long game, I think. We have no interest in hegemony and no intentions to challenge, defeat or replace the U.S. But the fact is the U.S. is frequently deploying Naval and Air Forces near China’s adjacent waters to flex muscles, decoupling with China’s economy, oppressing Chinese tech companies, smearing Chinese experts and overseas students, ganging up against China, and even forming an Asia Pacific NATO, and consistently interfering in China’s domestic affairs. I’m not trying to accuse the United States. Actually, these are all actions taken by the United States, and this is how they describe their China policy, exact words they use to describe their China policy. Particularly on the Taiwan question, the U.S. repeatedly violates One-China principle and undermines the political foundation for the establishment of China-U.S. diplomatic relations.

In the eyes of the Chinese people, this is containing and encircling China, and preventing them from pursuing a better life. So, where is the way out for China-U.S. relations? We have to face this question and try to answer this question. I think the only right way lies in the three principles proposed by President Xí Jìnpíng 習近平, which is respect each other, coexist in peace, pursue win-win cooperation. Actually, President Biden agreed to those principles when he talked with President Xi Jinping during their telephone conversation many times. He responded positively actually. The two heads of state have reached the important consensus on developing China-U.S. relations, and the key lies in implementation. We hope that the U.S. side can rectify its mentality toward China, form a rational perception of China, take concrete actions to implement President Biden’s positive remarks, and put the China-U.S. relations back on the right track of healthy and stable development as soon as possible.

Kaiser: I think you’ve put your finger on one very important point, which is this question, can the United States, as a power that really understands itself as exceptional, can it ever actually accept an equal? Can it actually make room for another country, and especially one, as you say, with such a very different history and a very different set of values? And I think that’s really very much the core of the question. Thank you very much, Minister Xu. As we sit down, President Xi Jinping has just concluded his first overseas trip since the pandemic broke out in late 2019. He was in Samarkand for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit. And naturally, a lot of the U.S. press has been focused on the meeting between President Xi and President Putin. But China has its own agenda. And it’s certainly not all about the relationship with Russia. There was a lot of effort to read into the remarks that President Putin made about China having concerns and questions about its role in Ukraine. What were China’s priorities for this meeting and what kind of a role does China see for the SCO, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? And what does Beijing see for China as a role within that organization?

Xu: Oh, this is a very good question. Well, I guess many people, especially in the Western world, they’re very interested in this meeting in this summit, and especially in the meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Putin. Let me give you a little bit about the history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The founding of, we call SCO is a significant event in international relations at the beginning of the 21st century. The SCO is a result of China and its neighbors exploration to establish a new security model, a new type of state-to-state relations, and a new type of, excuse me, regional cooperation. After the Cold War, China, Russia, and the Central Asian countries all faced the same common problem of stabilizing the border areas. In 1996 and 1997, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan signed agreements successively, agreeing on building confidence in the military field and a mutual reduction of armed forces in border areas.

The focus then was about border security. The five countries pursued their own border security in a way that respects other borders’ security interests. So, this is very important. After that, the five countries further expanded their cooperation of common security to combating non-traditional security threats of terrorism, extremism, and separatism, etc., that they all faced. In 2001, the SCO was founded and the Shanghai spirit was established, which features mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversity of civilizations and the pursuit of common development. Over the past 20 years, the SCO has continuously deepened cooperation in various fields and traveled a path of cooperation that aligns with regional realities and the needs of all parties. So, it evolved quite well over the past 21 years. The reason why many problems in the world today occur and drag on is, according to our opinion, is that some countries pursue unilateral security instead of common security for all. And they are more interested in their own development, in them development for all

Kaiser: Which countries do you have in mind?

Xu: Well, there are many, especially Western countries. Questions of the times faced by all countries are whether they want conflict or peace, confrontation or cooperation, unity or division. The SCO represents a new and correct choice for international relations and is worth noting and studying by other countries. We’re happy that the United States and U.S. politicians, they’re looking at it. They’re welcome to look at it. And hopefully, they can find something that is different from their practices and they find the practices useful for them. China will always, as always, contribute wisdom and strength to SCO because we are one of the founding member, unremittingly promote building the SCO community for a shared future and make it a more essential platform for member states to seek unity, promote stability and pursue development. Actually, this platform is becoming more and more attractive because more countries would like to join. But we are going to be very careful in the choice of new members.

Kaiser: What’s the significance of India and Pakistan, both attending this meeting?

Xu: Well, this is a difficult choice. These are two competing states in many areas, especially on national security issues, on border issues. But I think there is a consensus among the current members of a SCO that needs to be expanded. I think the choice of new members will be based on more careful discussion and based on consensus. We are looking at a outcome that will be acceptable for all current members.

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Kaiser: Okay. All the attention, of course, that the American press paid to the Putin-Xi meeting was, of course, because there’s a lot of interest in China’s position in the Ukraine war. That war has now dragged on for nearly seven months since February 24, and has clearly not gone the way that Vladimir Putin and his military leaders had expected. And I’m sure that many of our listeners want to better understand China’s position in that conflict and how that has evolved, if at all. Can you help us to better understand China’s thinking when it comes to that conflict? There’s a lot of debate over where China is really.

Xu: Right. This is another frequently asked question to China. We can understand why people are so interested in China’s position because we are considered as one of the most important major players on the world stage. For us, the root cause for why the Ukrainian issue evolved to what it is now is the deficiency of the European security architecture. History has repeatedly proved that only by respecting others’ safety and maintaining common safety of everyone. So, this is a kind of pattern that SCO, I said earlier, was trying to focus on. Can we ultimately guarantee our own safety? Trying to achieve absolute security in a way that harms the security interest of others will only result in absolute insecurity for all, which will inevitably lead to conflicts and wars. Just like in a neighborhood, we all live in a neighborhood.

If you keep expanding your yard, your backyard, or your front yard, refuse to set boundaries, move your fence in the direction of your neighbors, one step after another, and ignore the repeated warning of your neighbors, sooner or later, your neighbors will certainly fight with you. To resolve the Ukraine issue, all parties concerned should show the political will, restart peace talks, and jointly build a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security architecture on the basis of accommodating each other’s legitimate concerns. Well, many times we feel that we wanted to do more because the international community hope us to do more. But the fact is China is not a part of Ukraine issue. That said, we are still working very hard trying to promote peace and talks rather than fueling the fire. We believe that national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected as I said earlier.

The purposes and principles of the UN Charter must be upheld. The legitimate security concerns of all countries must be taken seriously. And all efforts conducing to the peaceful settlement must be supported. China’s stance is fair and objective. This position does not only apply to the Ukrainian crisis, but also somewhere else. If something similar happens elsewhere, China will take the same position. This is also the common position of many other countries, including, for example, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, just to name a few.

Kaiser: Minister Xu, even before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia on February 24, a lot of American pundits and analysts were drawing parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan. They were saying, “Today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Taiwan,” or words to that effect. My sense is that the more sophisticated analysts understood there are very, very significant differences and that people who draw this direct line from Ukraine and Taiwan have it fundamentally wrong, I would agree. But it would also be incorrect to imagine that Beijing isn’t thinking about Ukraine in some relation to Taiwan. It certainly matters. Surely, people in Beijing are thinking about responses to Russia’s invasion, about the severity of sanctions that were imposed, about what, for now at least, is a much greater transatlantic solidarity, and much more. Can you give us some insight into how what is happening in Ukraine is impacting how Beijing is thinking about Taiwan?

Xu: Well, apparently, there is an essential difference between the Taiwan question and the Ukraine issue. Taiwan has never been a country. It’s part of China. So, I do not have to repeat our longstanding position on China. I guess you understand it very clearly.

Kaiser: Yeah, so as our audience. Yeah.

Xu: I guess the reason why the Western world is so concerned about the Taiwan question in the context of the Ukrainian crisis is they are concerned about possible use of a force on the part of the Chinese government to resolve this question. Well, if people look at all the official documents, especially the three white papers released by the Chinese government, the latest one is the one that is released in this August, you will see that most part of these documents, and also the speeches delivered by our leadership, especially President Xi Jinping, on the Taiwan question, or related to the Taiwan question, most part of those documents and their speeches were about how to resolve the Taiwan question in a peaceful way.

But, of course, we will never renounce the use of a force as the last resort. Because we think how to resolve the Taiwan question is an internal issue. It’s up to the Chinese people, the Chinese government to decide what kind of way we are going to adopt to resolve this issue. It’s not up to any foreign parties to let us know if you want to use force or use peaceful means, especially the United States. I have to point out this, that when the United States has been using so much force against other countries, for Chinese people, it sounds very [hypocritical] for them to insist to use peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan question. Nevertheless, I still want to reiterate to reassure that we will always want to resolve the Taiwan question through peaceful means.

Kaiser: You’re right. As you mentioned, China released a white paper in August after Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi’s very controversial visits to Taipei, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, put out that paper and they reiterated, as you said, that Taiwan has always been part of China and so forth. It also put forward this idea that Beijing has pushed for a very long time, one country, two systems, and that that should be the basis of unification. But that seemed only to reinforce this impression among many people, I think, that China is inflexible, that it hasn’t adjusted maybe to a new reality. A reality that one country, two systems has lost a lot of support in Taiwan, especially since the 2019, 2020 Hong Kong protests and the imposition of the national security law. It also doesn’t recognize that China has changed too, that impression that people in Taiwan had of China during the Hú Jǐntāo 胡锦涛 years, I think it’s very fair to say is a very different impression than the China that they see since 2012. Are there new ideas that are coming out of Beijing about how to bring about the kind of peaceful reunification as Beijing describes it that it wants?

Xu: Well, I guess you do not need to always adjust your policy when it is a good policy. We believe that “one country, two systems” is really a very good policy. You must know that this policy actually is initiated, is created in order to resolve, to solve the Taiwan question several decades ago. But actually, it was first applied to the Hong Kong issue. And we believe it achieved a, in Hong Kong, achieved universally recognized success. Hong Kong has been rated as world’s freest economy for 25 consecutive years by Western institutions, once again, Western institutions, not according to Chinese institutions since its return to the motherland. The Hong Kong people have not only significantly improved their lives, but also enjoyed democratic rights, which they never had in the past.

I guess you must also know that under the British colonial rule, there was no democracy in Hong Kong. A governor was appointed to rule. And very importantly, the Chinese ethnic groups in Hong Kong were under discrimination, unfortunately. This is our land, of course, under colonial rule, but they have been discriminated. So, it can be said that without “one country two systems,” there is no prosperity, stability, democracy, and progress in Hong Kong.

Kaiser: You think that the policy is still a sound policy and that’s the reason why China hasn’t changed it. But for it to work, there needs to be some acceptance. And right now, it looks like, whereas people in Taiwan who were kind of deep blue, who were very Guómíndǎng 国民党, they were receptive to this idea in the past, during the Mǎyīngjiǔ 马英九 era, in the period around 2008. And look, they were very, very close to, I mean, when you had the policy, the Sān Tōng 三通, and all these very major improvements were happening. You can understand why it looked like “one country, two systems” was within reach. Don’t you feel like there’s any legitimacy to Taiwan’s sense that China has changed that maybe we don’t want to be a part of this China, whereas an older China from pre-2008 might have been much more attractive?

Xu: Yes. I know that many Western friends do not understand what is the essence of “one country, two systems.” And the Taiwanese, the separatist forces in Taiwan, they are trying to tarnish this concept of “one country, two systems.” Let me try to explain how we understand “one country, two systems.” The real nature of this policy is “one country” is the premise and the foundation of “two systems.” “Two systems” is subordinate to and it derives from “one country.” If people try to mix up those two concepts, or especially if people want to put “two systems” before, in front of “one country,” there will be problems.

Kaiser: Problems. Yeah.

Xu: Yeah, problems. So, in terms of adjustment and changes, well, when I said earlier that when you have a good policy, you do not have to change it all the time, it is also true that we are not going to adopt the exact same “One-China, two systems” policy in Taiwan when it is reunified. So, I think many of our documents has stated very clearly that, on the Taiwan question, the “one country, two systems” principle will obviously be the most inclusive and flexible solution. Taiwan is certainly not Hong Kong. It is impossible to copy the Hong Kong model in Taiwan. The Chinese government is more than willing to conduct extensive consultations with all walks of life in Taiwan under the premise of One-China, give full consideration to the realities in Taiwan, accommodate the interests and sentiments of our compatriots in Taiwan, and come up with a plan of “one country, two systems” in Taiwan. It’s written in the white paper. It’s written. It’s there in President Xi Jinping’s speeches and other senior officials’ speeches.

Kaiser: I think many people, even here in the U.S., understood why Beijing was so angered by Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan. And they certainly expected that Beijing would react, that it would retaliate in some ways, but I think a lot of us were disappointed. I would count myself among them, and maybe even surprised to see that cooperation on climate issues would be suspended. Can you explain why Beijing decided to suspend what had been, I think, really productive talks between John Kerry and Xiè Zhènhuá 解振华, and their teams? We are now on the brink of catastrophic and irreversible warming. There’s been massive heat waves in China, and in the U.S., and in Pakistan, and in India. Rapid melting at the poles. It seems like, even an issue like Taiwan doesn’t even compare to, to the big issue of the global climate. Why did Beijing decide to suspend climate talks?

Xu: Well, we are angered, but at the same time, I think we are very constrained, and we are very measured in terms of what kind of countermeasures we have been taking and will be taking to respond to the very unreasonable actions taken by the U.S. side with regard to Taiwan, including Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, and also the discussion and deliberation on the 2022 Taiwan Policies Act. Let me point out that this policy act, if passed in the current way, or if passed in any other way, there’s no way for them to make it a bill that is not damaging to China-U.S. relationship. Because of the purpose of proposing, of introducing such a bill is to give China a lesson, a kind of lesson that the United States will always be behind the Taiwanese, and especially the Taiwanese separatist forces, which is very, very unfortunate.

But coming back to your question about why climate change, well, we have to admit that special envoy Kerry, he has been very dedicated. He has invested so much in climate change, including the bilateral interaction between China and the United States. We are highly appreciative of the efforts he put in place to try to help resolve this extremely difficult issue and a challenging issue for the international community. But the stop of climate change dialogue between China and United States will never stop China’s action to achieve the goals we set for ourselves. We will, as always, actively participate in international and multilateral cooperation on climate change. China has always been earnest in fighting climate change. Let me give you some example, the consumption of non-fossil energy in China ranks first in the world.

And the installed capacity of hydropower, wind power, solar power, biomass power generation, and the production and sales of new energy vehicles all rank the first in the world. In the eight years to 2021, China conducted more than 200 foreign aid projects to address climate change. Before my current post in the United States, I worked on the relationship between China and the Pacific Island countries, including like Fiji, like Tonga, others. So, climate change cooperation is one of the key areas of cooperation between China and these island countries, which are so concerned about the rising of sea level, etc. The concept and the practice of green development are deeply integrated into the relationship between the two sides. I really hate to point fingers on the United States, but I do have to provide our audience with some facts on what the U.S. has been doing.

I think the Biden administration has been showing determination in dealing with climate change, both domestically and internationally, but the fact is what has been done, their actions have fallen far short of expectations. Last year, for example, U.S. fossil fuel consumption accounted for almost 80% of its primary energy consumption. Last week, the Biden administration issued leases for up to 1.7 million acres of its offshore oil and gas exploration, a move seen as a major shift in its stance on climate change. This is widely reported by the U.S. media outlets. So, the sincerity of the U.S. side is also questionable in our bilateral relationship. I mean, the U.S. bilateral cooperation with China on climate change, for example, the U.S. used the Xinjiang related issues as an excuse to sanction and oppress Chinese companies, photovoltaic companies.

Kaiser: Yeah, photovoltaic. Yeah.

Xu: Yeah. Creating obstacles for companies of the two countries to participate in climate change. And another very strange example, we still, we cannot understand why, the U.S. side has announced the termination of the China-U.S. Clean Energy Center project, which lasted for 10 years and they terminated in the first half of last year. Last year, if I remember correctly. Well, actually this is a very fruitful project for… Lasted for more than 10 years, as I said. People from both sides, those participants in the project, they’re very confused by this move.

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Kaiser: Yeah. I’m not familiar with that. I’ll have to ask. I’ll look into that. That’s sort of news to me.

Xu: Yeah, it’s located in the University of West Virginia actually. It’s actually an outcome of a joint venture during the Obama administration to deal with climate change.

Kaiser: Maybe Joe Manchin did it in. Anyway, there is… I would love to see more U.S.-China leadership in addressing the urgent need to stop global warming or to slow it at least.

Xu: Yeah. The facts I was trying to provide you is well, to show that even without U.S.-China dialogue on climate change, China will never give up its own effort, will never stop its own effort to achieve the goals we set domestically for ourselves, and also to honor our obligation to other countries that is in need.

Kaiser: I hope so. The rupture of global supply chains under the combined shock of COVID 19, export restrictions, other policies around technology, and of course, since the Ukraine war started in February, it’s been very damaging to many, if not indeed, all of the world’s major economies. We now see very worrisome inflation around the world, a chip shortage that has not been fully resolved at all. And now, even potential famine. The World Food Program says that nearly 50 million people in 45 countries are on the brink of starvation. Is there a way, even under these circumstances, for the U.S. and China, as the world’s two largest economies, to better coordinate to address these issues of global concern?

Xu: It is also always desire, in the part of China, to work with the U.S. side to promote bilateral trade and investment and economic relationship. Also, it is always strong desire to work with the United States to play a leading role to provide more stability for the international community to get out of the negative impact of COVID 19 sooner than later, and to prevent the whole world from another possible recession. Well, it is very important. But unfortunately, well, we do not see a very keen interest on the U.S. side to work with China in those areas. Actually, Secretary Blinken, in his speech on China policy in May, he did mention macroeconomy.

He did talk about this area as one of the six areas the United States think they want to work with China. But if we look at the obstacles, you will understand the difficulty the Chinese side is facing in working with the United States. Let me give you some example. The tariffs is the biggest issue. President Trump, the Trump administration, well, started the trade war, and now it is time to review the tariffs. And we hope, not just us, including many people in the United States and also the international community, all of us hoped that the Biden administration will adopt a different trade policy toward China, but unfortunately, the tariffs are still there. Actually, apparently, tariffs hurts manufacturers, farmers, and consumers. To be frank, we think those tariffs hurt the United States more than the Chinese.

Kaiser: I think that there’s a lot of awareness in the American Business Community, even among people in the leadership of an organization like well… Earlier this afternoon, I was giving a talk. And one of the other speakers at this is a former diplomat, and he’s somebody who’s very senior in trade. From his understanding, it’s really only politics that keeps back… There’s this understanding that the tariffs are damaging, but they don’t think that the Biden administration doesn’t believe that it is politically possible to drop tariffs right now because they’ll be attacked as being soft on China. So, it’s really, it’s hostage to that, and it’s very unfortunate.

Xu: It is. But even with tariffs, in 2021, the bilateral trade goods between China and the United States reached a record high. It’s $756 billion. So, this figure itself actually shows the very close, intertwined relationship, economic relationship between our two countries. You can imagine that if the tariffs were dropped, the bilateral trade will only be larger and trade volume will be larger.

Kaiser: Yeah, substantially larger.

Xu: The newly passed CHIPS and the Science Act is another obstacle. It’s aimed to well, as we understand, to contain China’s ability to advance the technology, especially chips. But actually, while those kind of practices will only bring about more damage, more disruption to the international supply chain and disruption to the international trade, additionally, the U.S. has also sanctioned and oppressed Chinese companies. At present, can you imagine more than 1,000 Chinese companies, Chinese entities, including companies, including private citizens, have been blacklisted by various bodies of the U.S. government? When we have those obstacles, it is very, very difficult for the Chinese government to say, “Okay, let’s work together. Let’s be happy and do business as nothing has happened.”

You talked about food security. It’s very interesting that the United States is pointing its fingers on China again. The fact is China has been making huge contribution to food security by feeding its own huge population. We have 1.4 billion people. I think feeding 1.4 billion people is a big contribution to world food security.

Kaiser: Yeah, inarguably.

Xu: Additionally, we are also offering huge food aid to developing countries in need. But let me give you a simple example to show if the United States is doing what it should be doing. In recent years, one third of the U.S. corns are used for biofuels. Maybe for climate purposes, I don’t know. The consumption in this purpose for one year is over 135 million tons, which could feed the whole African population. So, if you look at those facts, well, if China is not accused all the time by some American politicians, we do not want to point our fingers on the Americans. We would rather, to, well, shelf our differences and focus more on the positive side of the bilateral relationship. We think that there are lots of, lots of positive sides, lots of areas, common interest that need our cooperation. Well, these are the difficulties we are facing in terms of if there is possibility for China and the United States to work together on economic issues.

Kaiser: What are some of the moves that you would identify that the U.S. might make modest changes or concessions, even things that some people might dismiss as just sort of symbolic gestures that you are confident Beijing would reciprocate and respond to with some equal policy changes or concessions? For example, if the United States were to lift certain restrictions on Chinese state media operations in the U.S., which China cites as the reason why there were expulsions of, or non-visa renewals of American journalists in China, is it likely that China would be able to respond by reinstating journalist visas for American reporters? What are some of the low-hanging fruits that the United States could do that you think China would positively respond to? Could it get as far as even reopening the Chengdu and Houston consulates?

Xu: Over the past the 40 plus years since the establishment of the diplomatic relationship between China and the U.S., China has always made utmost efforts with the greatest sincerity to promote a sound and a stable development of bilateral relations. To be frank, as long as the U.S. can uphold mutual respect and equality, which is just the basic norm governing the international relations, China-U.S. relations can develop steadily, or even, as we say in China, in Chinese, by leaps and bounds. As it’s known to all, the two examples you mentioned are actually considered as unwarranted provocations by the Trump administration. Very unfortunate. And the Chinese side were compelled to take countermeasures. The incidents caused huge problems for journalists from both countries to cover the other country, or for localities, or for China and the U.S. to conduct normal exchanges.

Well, the closure of the Consulate General in Houston caused huge obstacle for people living in the eighth states in the Southern United States. They caused lots of trouble. Nevertheless, as long as the U.S. shows willingness and make some efforts to solve the problem, the Chinese side will reciprocate. Actually, we reciprocated from the beginning of the Biden administration. I will give you what happened on the media issue as an example. Last year, actually, many rounds of consultation between our two countries took place, resulted in a three-point consensus about the resolution of the media issue. These three consensus include first, both agreed to allow the other side’s currently employed resident journalists unhindered entry. Second, both agreed to grant the other side’s journalists, one-year, multiple entry visa. The U.S. side pledge to address issue of Chinese journalists duration of stay.

This is the second agreement. Third, the two sides agreed to approve new visa application of eligible journalists to be posted to the other country. It’s a complicated issue. So, the consensus, the agreement reached is also complicated. But so far, the issue concerning Chinese journalists duration of stay has not been completed, solved yet. Unfortunately, some of them are still facing the situation that they may have to leave the country, the United States anytime. So, they have all their luggage packed. We hope that the U.S. can honor its words, put relevant measures and policies in place as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the U.S. should work to revoke the wrong practice of registering the Chinese media outlets as foreign agents and listing them as foreign missions so as to remove obstacles in the way to complete solution of these issues. These are the biggest questions actually, and problems.

On your question of whether or not to reopen China’s Consulate General in Houston and the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, many people hope that this will happen, but while… As we say in China, he who tied the bell to the tiger must take it off. So, we think, and we hope that the U.S. side must take the first step to resolve the problem.

Kaiser: You’re suggesting that if they were to do that, China would reciprocate?

Xu: We will never reject any goodwill suggestion from the U.S. side to resume dialogue, resume cooperation, resume anything that will be inclusive to promote a better relationship actually.

Kaiser: You still maintain, though, that this was a unilateral move on the part of the Trump administration to close the Houston Consulate. It’s true, they did act first to close the Houston Consulate before Chengdu was closed in reciprocity. I think that at least is factually accurate. Let’s talk about one of the consequences, I think, is most tragic about this downturn in relations between China and the United States, and that is the shrinking of people-to-people contacts. I know that myself, I have not been to China since October 2019, and I mean, it’s tragic. I used to go many times a year, even after I moved there, after living there for 20 years. This, of course, is because of the COVID-19 pandemic, but it has really exacerbated the problem of diminishing contacts. We are seeing a very steep drop off of international students, but especially of students from China here in the United States. I worry about what the long-term impact of this is going to be. I can’t help, but think that it’s going to hurt both countries, not just the United States, but also China. What is China willing to do to try to address this situation, to try to improve the situation with people-to-people contacts and international students?

Xu: Yeah, it is hurting both sides. To be frank, that ultimately, it will also hurt the whole world. As you said, the decline in people-to-people exchanges between China and U.S. in recent years is a major consequence of the deterioration of bilateral relations. COVID-19, of course, caused huge consequences on people-to-people exchange. But I think it is only a layer of frost on the snow. The political virus of the so-called China threat disinformation spread in the U.S. society is the thick snow that has blocked people-to-people exchanges. This political virus has not only made more and more American people afraid of communicating with China, but also made more and more Chinese people fearful of the so-called beautiful country in their mind. For example, the Trump administration issued an executive order imposing a discriminatory visa policy on Chinese students in the name of national security.

(Video) The Coming War on China? (Military Power Documentary) [4k] | Real Stories

And while it caused a sharp drop of Chinese students studying in the United States, actually, it also caused a serious psychological harm and huge economic losses to Chinese students and their families. Why? I don’t know if you know this fact that even after the Biden administration took office, many students actually were stopped, were interrogated and sent back to China when they tried to enter the border of the United States with legal visas. So, the result of those kind of measures is very interesting. Recently, it is reported that the number of Chinese students studying in Canada, the U.K., Singapore, and other countries was on the rise in the first half of this year, while the number of U.S. visa issued to Chinese students dropped by 50% compared with that several years ago, suggesting that the willingness of Chinese students to study in the U.S. has greatly decreased.

We heard clear and loud that the Biden administration, senior officials have repeatedly declared that Chinese students are welcomed to study in the United States, but the poisonous impact of the previous administration’s wrong policies, wrong measures is still spreading. You must know that there is a so-called China Initiative done by the U.S. Department of Justice, which engaged in racial profiling and unwilful prosecutes Chinese scholars, creating fears of return of McCarthyism in the Chinese community. Although the initiative has been ostensibly canceled, its chilling effect is still lingering, making ethnic Chinese scientists and others who have normal academic ties with China extremely worried about their own situation. We visited many universities in the United States and we heard those kind of expression of concern almost in all of those U.S. universities.

You can see that this is seriously undermining the mutually beneficial, scientific, and technological exchange and the cooperation between China and the United States. Well, I have to say something about what I heard from the local Chinese community about their concern. Well, because this group of people of U.S. citizen, actually, they have been playing a very important role in promoting people-to-people, and culture exchange between China and the United States. However, the deterioration of China-U.S. relations has led to a sharp rise in the anti-Asian sentiment that centered on the hatred towards Chinese, and the violent incidents in the United States, I was told by many people that the so-called anti-Asian sentiment, actually is anti-Chinese sentiment.

This caused serious damage to Asian communities, both physically and mentally. Many American Chinese told us, told me actually, they love the U.S. as well as their country of origin, China. And that the U.S. policy toward China has put them in a difficult situation, very difficult situation.

Kaiser: Yeah. I absolutely agree. I think that you’re right, that anti-Asian sentiment often is really wrapped up in anti-Chinese sentiment. There’s no question about that. But even to talk about that here in the United States, to say that sometimes you’re met with this claim that, “Oh, you’re just repeating points that are made by the Communist Party of China.” To which I will answer, the fact that you are so scared of allowing the Chinese Communist Party to score this one point just proves to me that there’s a zero-sum mentality at work. That you are so reluctant to even correct this problem, and to admit that there is an element of xenophobia, and this was created because of the Trump administration’s repeated use of phrases like China virus. If you can’t admit that, then there is a zero-sum problem here, and you’ve only proven the point.

So, yeah. Excellent. Let me turn, we were talking earlier about the effects of COVID-19, the pandemic on the diminution of exchanges between China and the United States. And you said that this was just the, you said sort of the thin smoke rather than the thick smoke, but I understand that argument, let’s talk about China’s zero-COVID policy and how we should understand that. In the U.S. and other international media, it’s often portrayed as just the product of the leadership’s stubbornness and unwillingness to admit that maybe a policy that was a very good one, that worked very well for the original SARS-CoV-2 isn’t the right policy for the Omicron variants. Is that incorrect? What do you think is really driving, at this point, China to continue these lockdowns? Recently, Chengdu was locked down, for example. And does it seem that not nearly as much effort is going into vaccinations that can protect against the Omicron variants? Instead, there’s so much effort being put on testing and on quarantines that, at least from the west, it looks like vaccination, immunization isn’t being given as much attention.

Xu: Well, many interpretations on China’s policy is only focused on one aspect of the policy. Well, in terms of our COVID-19 prevention policy, people focus only on zero and miss out dynamic. We have to look at the policy in its totality. Our policy is “dynamic zero.” So, we have to pay attention to “dynamic.”

Kaiser: What does that mean exactly? What does dynamic mean?

Xu: Well, it means that… Well, let me explain the whole thing, okay?

Kaiser: Okay.

Xu: Well, China puts people’s safety and health first and adheres to the general policy of dynamic zero, which fully reflects the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government’s governing philosophy that the people come first and life comes first. I’m not saying that other governments do not pay attention to their people’s livelihood. What I’m saying is our policy is really a reflection of the philosophy of the Party and the government. So, for more than two years, since the outbreak of COVID-19, the infection rate and death rate in China have maintained the lowest level in the world. While the average life expectancy in some developed countries, such as the United States has declined during the pandemic, China’s average life expectancy has risen steadily in the past two years, more than two years.

China is a country with a large population, including more than 500 million elderly and children. China is also a country of uneven regional development and insufficient medical resources. According to a research article in the Nature Medicine Journal, if China follows the example of some countries and, as we say in China now, lying flat, that could cause 112 million infections and nearly 1.6 million deaths. So, all these show China’s COVID-19 prevention and control policies are scientific, correct, and effective. You talked about vaccination. Actually, the Chinese government, central government, and also local governments, they’re trying very, very hard to convince their population of citizens, including the elderly and the children, to be vaccinated, but some are very reluctant. Maybe one of the reasons is they feel that they don’t have to take the vaccination because they’re so safe.

Some of the elderly have health issues, so they’re not sure about if they want to, they’re not sure about side effect of the vaccines. All vaccines have side effects. So, when some Americans discuss China’s COVID-19 prevention policy, as I said, that they often forget about dynamic. They only look at zero. In fact, dynamic zero does not seek zero infection, but strives to stop the widespread of COVID-19 at the least cost and in the shortest time, which not only ensures the safety and health of the people, but also minimizes the impact on economic and social development. I’m very proud of my hometown actually, Zhejiang Province, especially the capital of Zhejiang Province.

Kaiser: Okay. So, the 20th Party congress is starting on October 16. What should we be watching particularly closely in the upcoming Party congress? Will it have any impact, for example, on the U.S.-China relations?

Xu: Well, everybody is looking at the 20th National Congress of CPC. It is a very extremely, extremely important domestic political agenda for us. I think the United States will be watching at it and the world will be watching at it. I think there will be a very comprehensive discussion on all issues related to China’s future domestic development agenda and also our international agenda in five years or maybe in the long run. As every Party congress does, I guess people can expect that President Xi Jinping will be delivering a very important speech on all the important issues I mentioned. So, concerning the impact of this congress to the China-U.S. relationship, I’m not part of the group that have been working on the preparation and also drafting the documents for the congress, but as a career diplomat and as a Chinese official, I can say that our opinion on the international relationship will be one of the big topics in the congress.

Kaiser: Yeah, I can imagine.

Xu: I’m not sure if China-U.S. relationship, by itself, will be discussed. I think it will be discussed, but I’m not sure whether the outside world will be able to read something in particular about this relationship. But I think what we discussed in general in this Congress and what would be delivered by President Xi Jinping’s speech will provide a large degree of predictability and the stability for the bilateral relationship between China and the United States…

Kaiser: Very good.

Xu: …On the side of the Chinese.

Kaiser: In terms of damage to China’s image among Americans, probably there isn’t a single issue in recent years that has loomed larger than Xinjiang and the large-scale detention of Uyghur and other Muslim people there. Now, I am very familiar, as I’m sure many of our listeners are, with the official Chinese position on this, that this was a response to problems of religious extremism and separatism that led to acts of terrorism. That the program’s intent is to provide language and vocational training to people, to help them to assimilate into society and become productive members of society. So, I don’t think we need to repeat any of that, but as a diplomat, one of the skills you must have is the ability to see things from the other side, and to try to understand those views, even if you don’t agree, even if you don’t share them. Let me ask you this, if you were asked by a Chinese colleague of yours, by someone in the foreign ministry to explain, having understood the Americans first of all, explain why is the issue of Xinjiang so emotionally impactful for Americans, why do Americans seem to care so much about it, and explain that from the point of view of Americans, how would you explain that to a senior party leader who asked you?

Xu: I will try to explain it from the U.S. perspective.

Kaiser: Yeah. that’s what-

Xu: Before that, I have to say that China’s affairs must be seen from a Chinese perspective. What we are asking of the United States is, please respect our perspective because we have a very special national condition. And we believe that we have the right to enforce our policies, to adopt our policies, and solve our issues according to how we understand it. And the most important thing is we have to look at what is going on in Xinjiang on the basis of facts. You told me that you more understand what is going on in Xinjiang, but actually, I don’t think all Americans understand or are willing to try to understand what is going on in Xinjiang. Well, lots of U.S. politicians describe what is going on in Xinjiang as genocide and forced labor. Their conclusion, unfortunately, are often based on some anti-China forces’ lies. I hate to use the word, but I have to say they are lies, or so-called satellite images that mistake some residential buildings or factories for the so-called concentration camps. I’m just giving you some-

(Video) The China Alternative: Panel Discussion - Session 1

Kaiser: Sure. If we only look at, at what China has talked about openly, and just let’s stick to only those things, that there are reeducation centers through which a large number of people have been put, and it’s not voluntary. We all know this. This is all accepted. I don’t want to talk about genocide. I don’t want to talk about anything like that. I don’t want to talk even about forced labor, but I just want to hear your understanding of why you think Americans are so emotionally attached to this issue. Are you saying that it’s just because they’ve believed lies or is there more to it?

Xu: I think there are two groups of Americans. One group is U.S. politicians, especially those hawkish, China hawkish. Well, they have never been to China. They have never been to Xinjiang. They only want to well, to judge Xinjiang, to judge China according to the information they get, which is very limited, which could be very misleading, which could be lies, just like I said earlier. We try to approach them, reach out to them, and exchange ideas with them on telling them what exactly happened in China, in Xinjiang, and what is the reason for the autonomous region’s government to, and also the central government, to take the very firm measures that are in place, but we were not provided those opportunities, even to explain, even to provide the facts. They totally reject hearing the facts provided from us.

I don’t know what the reason is. Maybe they’re too busy. Maybe they do not want to talk with Chinese at all. Another group of people, I think, regular American citizens, they are raised in a very different culture than the Chinese. So, they attach different importance to the concept of human rights. As you can imagine, they do not listen to Chinese media reports. They listen to Fox news or CNN, or they read New York Times or Washington Post, etc. It’s very natural. I guess they will be very easily influenced by the description from U.S. politicians and also the news outlets, the media outlets description on Xinjiang. I would say that they have been influenced by misinformation and disinformation. I believe that if they can be exposed to the facts, to the realities in Xinjiang, I think that they will have a better understanding of why the Chinese government will adopt the policy we have been putting in place.

And actually, we are very proud for what as being achieved in Xinjiang, because our way of countering terrorism and extremism are more effective than the Western practices. You said that some people are accepted by the kind of boarding school, as we describe in China, to accept education on laws and to accept education on how to respect lives, etc., and also who are offered opportunities to learn some skills for living, etc. These are very effective ways for those people to stay away from extreme ideology and terrorism. We do not want to wait until those people, especially the younger generation, have to be put into prison. We take preventive actions for them to stay away from these extreme ideologies.

Kaiser: But you can understand how-

Xu: And we have been very successful.

Kaiser: Yeah. But you can understand how that preemptive approach would really bother a lot of Americans, the idea that somebody who has the potential to commit some kind of crime just because they fit a particular profile of expression of religious beliefs or other practices, even dietary restrictions and things like that, that based on this information, you would say, “Well, this person should be reeducated now.” You can see why, I mean, if you were to explain this, I’d try to suggest to a Party official why it is that Americans object to this, I think it’s clear that these types of practices would run very much counter to a lot of basic American precepts about law. I mean, I think it’s important for people to understand why this elicits such a strong emotional impact, and maybe that does predispose them to think the worst. Maybe it does make them, maybe more suggestible to what some of the more hawkish politicians are saying.

Now, I understand that it’s difficult, given your position again, to answer a question like this, but I want to ask anyway, are there things that you think that China has done in its public diplomacy that you believe have created unintended or unhelpful perceptions and actually have set back China’s diplomacy, it’s public diplomatic efforts?

Xu: I think in most cases, this kind of scenario happened due to the misreading of China’s legitimate and necessary responses to provocations, hostile and wrong words and disses toward China. So, when responding to those wrongdoings on China, we tend to be very firm, very angry, and very affirmative. Those kind of response, normally, is considered as, well, assertive…

Kaiser: You’re talking about the wolf-warrior kind of approach that China takes. So, when Zhào Lìjiān 赵立坚 on the podium uses very, very strong language in response to some American provocation, you think that it’s just misperception on American part that they-

Xu: Yeah. “Wolf warrior” is the description that is imposed on Chinese diplomats so far.

Kaiser: What would you call it? Just assertive?

Xu: Well, I wouldn’t even use the word assertive. I think the language used by him or other Chinese diplomats are stronger than others, but I think they are just trying to tell, to express their strong feelings on the wrongdoings imposed on China. I think they have the right to express emotionally what they think. We do have some obstacles in telling a better China story, as you said. Well, as a matter of fact, we meet with a lot of American people who are very biased against China. So, whatever you tell them, they will just not believe in it. They will describe whatever the Chinese government or Chinese government officials have been trying to tell them as propaganda, which is very unfortunate. And we want to describe those kind of people as people who pretend to be asleep. You can never wake people who pretend to be asleep.

But we also meet with lots of American friends that are very interested in Chinese culture, Chinese political system, and the Chinese economic development, and the Chinese social aspirations, etc. And they are very interested in Chinese stories that are not so welcomed by another group of American people.

Kaiser: Sure, yeah.

Xu: You asked about what is holding China back? Our job as diplomats, as Chinese officials, our job is to try to provide facts. If facts won’t be accepted by some people in the Western world, I can only say that it is lost for them, not for China. But of course, there are always rooms, spaces for us to improve our work to promote China, our country. And we believe that China’s story is a very good story because we are so proud that China has been making huge achievements, not just economic achievements. We have so many good stories to let the world know. And we believe that most of the stories will be welcomed, will be accepted, will be loved by those people who have an open heart and open mind.

Kaiser: Surely, you’ve seen how the Chinese effort to tell China’s story while the jiǎng hǎo zhōngguó gùshì 讲好中国故事 in the Global South has been much better received, that if you look at the perception polls that have been done, and there have been several of them, attitudes toward China in the global south are uniformly much, much better. So, in the West and in, so in North America, and in Europe especially, or in Australia, it’s been a lot more challenging. Do you think that this is primarily due to the kind of hold that the English-language media has on the narrative in the West, the huàyǔ quán 话语权, the discursive power, as Chinese say, of the Western media? Or do you think that it’s something maybe more historical or cultural, or a difference in shared values? What do you think is the root of that problem?

Xu: I think both. The reason why China’s story is more welcomed in the developing countries is because they share more commonality in tradition. I want to say culture and history, in their own history.

Kaiser: A shared history of exploitation under colonialism for one thing.

Xu: Yeah. Maybe. And also, they have a better understanding of the achievements China is able to make over the past 70 years since the establishment of the People’s Republic, especially since the adoption of the Reform and Opening Up Policy. And they admire China as a pioneer in achieving economic development in such a short period of time. And they very much want to learn from China how it is able to make it, and they want to share our philosophy of governance and our way of taking care of our own people, and our way of promoting democracy etc. The language barrier is one factor that could make Westerners feel difficult to understand the China story, but people living in, for example, Africa, in Pacific Island countries, they also speak a very different language, English, French, or other languages. But why can they better understand the China stories?

Kaiser: Yeah, that’s a good point. Yeah.

Xu: Yeah. I think language is important, but language is not a very big issue if the audience is willing to understand China and is receptive to the ideas and philosophies adopted by the Chinese. So, I think ultimately, respect and mutual understanding is very important for the Western world to understand, and to accept China stories.

Kaiser: Thank you very much Minister Xu Xueyuan from the Chinese embassy, Deputy Chief of Mission. You’ve been very, very generous with your time, and I want to thank you for sitting down with me tonight.

(Video) Kaiser Kuo of Sinica on Modern China and US-China relations - #5

Xu: Thank you have for having me on board.

Kaiser: The Sinica Podcast is powered by The China Project and is a proud part of the Sinica Network. Our show is produced and edited by me, Kaiser Kuo. We would be delighted if you would drop us an email at, or just give us a rating and a review on Apple Podcasts as this really does all people discover the show. Meanwhile, follow us on Twitter or on Facebook at @thechinaproj, and be sure to check out all the shows in the Sinica Network. Thanks for listening, and we’ll see you next week. Take care.


Who is the current Chinese ambassador to the United States? ›

Clemons: Ambassador Qin Gang, Chinese ambassador to United States. I really appreciate your candor for you joining us today and talking us through these issues. Thank you so much. Ambassador Qin: Thank you.

Does the US have a Chinese embassy? ›

Embassy of China, Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. 3505 International Place, N.W. As of 2021, the ambassador is Qin Gang, appointed in July 2021 and the twelfth holder of the role since the opening of the liaison office in May 1973.

How do I contact the Chinese Embassy? ›

  1. As a branch of the Chinese Embassy in the United States, the Cultural Office is dedicated to: ...
  2. Tel: 202-966-0697.
  3. Fax: 202-9660904.

Where is China's largest embassy? ›

In 2019, China had the largest diplomatic network in the world. China hosts a large diplomatic community in its capital city of Beijing. Beijing hosts 173 embassies, with numerous countries maintaining consulates general and consulates throughout the country.

How many Chinese embassies are there in the United States? ›

The People's Republic of China currently maintains one Embassy in Washington D.C., five Consulates-General in the following U.S. cities: New York, NY; Chicago, IL; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Houston, TX.

Is China issuing visas right now? ›

Visa. The Chinese Embassy in India updated “Application Procedures and Material Requirements of China Visa”, which will be implemented from 24 August, 2022.

What countries have no U.S. Embassy? ›

The U.S. has embassies in all countries it recognizes apart from Afghanistan, Bhutan, Iran, Maldives, Syria and Yemen.

Will the U.S. Embassy fly me home? ›

Can the U.S. Embassy send me home in a crisis? Only in limited circumstances. The embassy may help citizens with an emergency evacuation in a major crisis, such as a natural disaster or civil unrest.

How do I get a Chinese visa in USA? ›

Tourist Application Requirements for a China Visa
  1. Passport. You must provide your actual signed passport, including one copy of the personal information page of your passport. ...
  2. Photographs. ...
  3. Letter of Invitation. ...
  4. Proof of State Residency. ...
  5. CIBTvisas Order Form. ...
  6. Travel Record. ...
  7. Health Declaration. ...
  8. Authorization Letter.

How much does it cost to get a visa for China? ›

The standard Chinese Visa cost for United States citizens is $140. But the cost varies depending on the number of entries and based on the country that grants your passport. Some small additional fees such as service fees and taxes can increase the final cost of a China visa cost.

How much is the visa application fee for China? ›

Generally the cost is $140 for an American citizen, and for citizens of other countries, the fee ranges from $30 to $90. It is normally paid on visa collection, but in some localities it must be paid when you apply.

How long does it take to get a visa to China? ›

Chinese Visa application Service Centre will submit your application to the Consulate-General of the People's Republic China in Calgary for processing. A visa typically takes four working days to process if all the accompanying documents meet the requirements.

How many countries have a Chinese embassy? ›

The EmbassyPages for China list all foreign embassies and consulates in China and all Chinese embassies and consulates abroad. China has 172 embassies abroad as well as 97 consulates and five other representations.

How many embassies does China have around the world? ›

There are about 147 Foreign Embassies and 180 Consulates placed in the territory of China. China itself in total counts near 161 Embassies and 67 Consulates spread all over the world.

How many Chinese embassy are there? ›

The people's Republic of China currently maintains one Embassy in Washington D.C., but also maintains 5 consulates-general in the following U.S. cities: New York, NY; Chicago, IL; San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; Houston, TX.

Is my 10 year China visa valid? ›

For US citizens, the 10-year China visa is still valid and they can enter China by carrying both your old and new passports, provided that the personal details on both passports are consistent.

What is the difference between embassy and consulate? ›

Embassies are the main representatives of their home country, whereas consulates are additional diplomatic offices. Embassies and consulates are considered legal territories of their home countries, meaning that the host country does not have jurisdiction over the embassy of another country.

Who is Chinese ambassador? ›

Qin Gang (Chinese: 秦刚; pinyin: Qín Gāng; born 19 March 1966) is a Chinese diplomat who is serving as the 11th and current Chinese Ambassador to the United States. He was the vice minister of foreign affairs of China before his mission to the United States.

Did China cancel all visas? ›

In view of the rapid global spread of COVID-19, China has decided to temporarily suspend the entry of foreign nationalities with currently valid visas or residence permits, as of 28th March 2020 0:00 am. Entry of foreign nationalities with APEC Business Travel Cards will be suspended as well.

Can Chinese citizens visit USA? ›

Chinese citizens who are planning to travel to the United States for short periods of time must apply for a US B1/B2 VISA FOR THE CITIZENS OF CHINA.

How do I get a visa for China in 2022? ›

Please fill out your visa application form and make a reservation online through Please DON'T forget to print out your visa application form as well as the reservation form in advance before submitting your application at the scheduled time.

How ambassadors are appointed in China? ›

In accordance with articles 67 and 81 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, ambassadors are selected by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and officially appointed by the President of the People's Republic of China.

Who is the US ambassador to Taiwan? ›

Brent Christensen
William Brent Christensen
SpouseBrenda Barrus Christensen
Alma materBrigham Young University George Washington University Oregon Health & Science University
12 more rows

Who is Canada's ambassador to China? ›

“I am pleased to announce the appointment of Jennifer May as Canada's Ambassador to China.

When was George Bush ambassador to China? ›

In 1974, President Gerald Ford appointed him as the Chief of the Liaison Office to the People's Republic of China, and in 1976 Bush became the Director of Central Intelligence.
George H. W. Bush
In office January 20, 1989 – January 20, 1993
Vice PresidentDan Quayle
Preceded byRonald Reagan
Succeeded byBill Clinton
57 more rows

How do you become a US Ambassador? ›

In the United States, ambassadors are appointed to represent the office of the President in foreign nations.
How to Become an Ambassador: 5 Steps to Success
  1. Earn a relevant bachelor's degree. ...
  2. Earn a graduate degree. ...
  3. Gain work experience. ...
  4. Take the Foreign Service Officer exam. ...
  5. Receive appointment.
5 Mar 2020

What is called Ambassador? ›

An ambassador is an official envoy, especially a high-ranking diplomat who represents a state and is usually accredited to another sovereign state or to an international organization as the resident representative of their own government or sovereign or appointed for a special and often temporary diplomatic assignment.

Who is Chanel ambassador? ›

5) Jennie for Chanel and Calvin Klein

The singer is often seen wearing Chanel clothing and her youthful vibe is a perfect fit for their brand. She is also lovingly known as Coco Jennie by members of the Chanel family.

How many US citizens are in Taiwan? ›

Americans in Taiwan are residents of Taiwan who are from the United States. 4,742 Americans citizens were living in Taiwan, as of 2020.

When was the last time a US diplomat went to Taiwan? ›

On 9 August 2020, U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar visited Taiwan to meet President Tsai Ing-wen, the first visit by an American official since the break in diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei in 1979.

How many countries recognize Taiwan? ›

The Republic of China (ROC), commonly known as Taiwan, has full diplomatic relations with 13 of the 193 United Nations member states and with the Holy See (Vatican City).

Who is the ambassador of Canada? ›

Before his appointment by President Biden and unanimous confirmation by the U.S. Senate as U.S. Ambassador to Canada, David L. Cohen served as Senior Advisor to the CEO at Comcast Corporation as of January 1, 2020.

Who is the new prime minister of Canada? ›

Justin Trudeau (born December 25, 1971) is Canada's 23rd Prime Minister. His vision of Canada is a country where everyone has a real and fair chance to succeed.

Who is Canada's Prime Minister 2022? ›

The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, today announced the following changes in the senior ranks of the Public Service: Annette Gibbons, currently Associate Deputy Minister of Employment and Social Development, becomes Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, effective October 31, 2022.


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